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SYMPOSIUM: BOWSHER v. SYNAR
INTRODUCTION
Alfred C. Aman, Jr.t
The papers in this symposium examine constitutionally significant separation-of-powers themes that were particularly controversial in Franklin Roosevelt's administrations and once again
command our attention. The Supreme Court's decision in cases
such as Immigration & NaturalizationServices v. ChadhaI and Bowsher v.
Synar 2 have helped to resurrect questions that have been ignored, if
not resolved, since the 1930s. This symposium focuses on the contemporary debate that these issues have generated, and it provides
us with an array of approaches to and perspectives on that debate.
As this Introduction emphasizes, that these issues have arisen
before is significant, both legally and historically. The reemergence
of these issues and themes invites a reassessment of many of the
decisions of the Roosevelt Era and, more urgently, perhaps, it challenges us to distinguish our contemporary problems and political
solutions from those of the past. It is toward this end that this Introduction sketches at least some of the parallels between the issues
presented during the New Deal and those we face today.
I
BLACK MONDAY-MAY

27, 1935

1935 was not a good year for the Roosevelt Administration.
The Supreme Court struck down as unconstitutional virtually all of
the New Deal legislation that came before it that year.3 May 27,
1935-"Black Monday" according to Justice Jackson-was a particularly bad day. In his book, The Struggle forJudicial Supremacy, Justice
t
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1 462 U.S. 919 (1983).
2 106 S. Ct. 3181 (1986).
See, e.g., LouisvilleJoint Stock Land Bank v. Radford, 295 U.S. 555 (1935) (Frazier-Lemke Act); A.L.A. Schechter Poultry Corp. v. United States, 295 U.S. 495 (1935)
(section 3 of National Industrial Recovery Act); Railroad Retirement Bd. v. Alton R.R.,
295 U.S. 330 (1935) (Railroad Retirement Act); Panama Ref. Co. v. Ryan, 293 U.S. 388
(1935) (section 9 of National Industrial Recovery Act). But see Perry v. United States,
294 U.S. 330 (1935) (sustaining validity ofJoint Resolution ofJune 5, 1933, which declared gold payment contracts illegal); Nortz v. United States, 294 U.S. 317 (1935)
(same); Norman v. Baltimore & Ohio R.R., 294 U.S. 240 (1935) (same).
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Jackson noted that "[u]p to this time the blows delivered by the
Court had come at intervals-short, to be sure, but nevertheless
with breathing spaces. At the close of the Court's term, however, on
4
May 27, the Court struck three times."
In LouisvilleJoint Stock Land Bank v. Radford,5 the Court set aside
bankruptcy law amendments designed to help farm owners in distress. Specifically, Congress enacted the Frazier-Lemke Act, 6 which
provided mortgagors with a modicum of relief, arguably at the expense of certain mortgagees. In declaring the Act unconstitutional
as applied, a unanimous Court, in an opinion written by Justice
Brandeis, held that "the Fifth Amendment commands that, however
great the Nation's need, private property shall not be thus taken
7
even for a wholly public use without just compensation."
Of apparently even greater significance to the long-run future
of the New Deal was the Court's second decision that fateful day.
A.L.A. Schechter Poultry Corp. v. United States8 involved a challenge to
the constitutionality of the National Industrial Recovery Act. 9 This
was, perhaps, among the most experimental and important legislative programs devised by the Roosevelt Administration up to that
point. President Roosevelt initiated the Act in a message to Congress in which he asked "for the machinery necessary for a great cooperative movement throughout all industry in order to obtain wide
reemployment, to shorten the working week, to pay a decent wage
for the shorter week and to prevent unfair competition and disastrous overproduction." 1 0 Congress complied, passing an Act that,
among other things, gave the President broad authority to approve
fair codes of competition for certain trades and industries.
The Supreme Court had already reviewed a portion of this Act
earlier in the year. In Panama Refining Co. v. RyanII it struck down
section 9 of the Act as violative of the nondelegation doctrine.
Schechter challenged the validity of section 3 of the Act, which delegated to the President the authority to set fair codes of competition
for various trades and industries. The Court noted that
12
"[e]xtraordinary conditions may call for extraordinary remedies,"
but continued, "[e]xtraordinary conditions do not create or enlarge
4
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295 U.S. 555 (1935).
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Pub. L. No. 73-486, 48 Stat. 1289 (1934).
295 U.S. at 602.
295 U.S. 495 (1935).
Pub. L. No. 73-67, 48 Stat. 195 (1933).
H.R. Doc. No. 37, 73d Cong., 1st Sess. 1 (1933), quoted in R.JACKSON, supra note
110-11.
293 U.S. 388 (1935).
295 U.S. at 528.
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constitutional power."' 3 The Court held that section 3 of the Act
unconstitutionally delegated legislative power to the Executive, stating, "Congress is not permitted to abdicate or to transfer to others
the essential legislative functions with which it is... vested."' 14 The
delegation of legislative power was so broad and seemed to involve
so many private groups that even Justice Cardozo, who had dissented' 5 from the majority's rather rigid application of the delegation doctrine in Panama Refining, concurred 16 in the majority's
conclusion in Schechter. Indeed, for him, this Act represented "an
attempted delegation not confined to any single act nor to any class
or group of acts identified or described by reference to a standard.
Here in effect is a roving commission to inquire into evils and upon
17
discovery correct them."'
The shock waves generated by Schechter constituted a significant
but not a wholly unexpected setback for the Roosevelt Administra8
tion. The Court's opinion in Humphrey's Executor v. United States,'
however, was both significant and surprising. In that case, the
Court refused to allow President Roosevelt to remove William E.
Humphrey, a Federal Trade Commissioner appointed by President
Hoover. Roosevelt had become convinced that, for the Trade Commission to function properly, personnel changes were badly needed,
and Humphrey, as the most reactionary and obstructive of its members, simply had to go. Humphrey would not go quietly, however;
he declined to resign. In removing him, Roosevelt did not want to
attack Humphrey directly. He thus based the removal on grounds
that did not reflect on the Commissioner personally, but highlighted
the disagreement that existed between Humphrey's policies and
those that the Administration wished to carry out.
This should have sufficed, given the state of the law at that
time. 19 Myers v. United States20 seemed to grant virtually total discretion to the President when it came to removing government officials,
even commissioners like Humphrey. As ChiefJustice Taft explained
in Myers:
[T]here may be duties of a quasi-judicial character imposed on
executive officers and members of executive tribunals whose deci-

sions after hearing affect interests of individuals, the discharge of
which the President can not in a particular case properly influence
13
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Id.
Id. at 529.
293 U.S. at 433.
295 U.S. at 551.

Id
295 U.S. 602 (1935).
See R. JACKSON, supra note 4, at 107-08.
272 U.S. 52 (1926).
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or control. But even in such a case he may consider the decision

after its rendition as a reason for removing the officer, on the
ground that the discretion regularly entrusted to that officer by
statute has not been on the whole intelligently or wisely exercised.
Otherwise he does not discharge his own 2constitutional duty of
seeing that the laws be faithfully executed. '
It is not surprising that this passage was written by a former
President. Myers certainly regards the problems of "recalcitrant
commissioners" from a presidential viewpoint, emphasizing that it is
the President's article II duty to faithfully execute the laws. It was,
however, surprising to President Roosevelt when the Court in
Humphrey's Executor rebuffed his attempt to exert this same kind of
control. Justice Jackson characterized the decision in this way:
What the Court had before declared to be a constitutional duty of
the President had become in Mr. Roosevelt a constitutional offense. Small wonder that the decision became a political instrument. Those who saw executive dictatorship just round the
comer had their fears confirmed: the President could be restrained only by the Court. Those who thought the ghost of dictatorship wore judicial robes had their fears, too, confirmed: the
rules different from
Court was applying to President Roosevelt
22
those it had applied to his predecessors.

In retrospect, one might now add that Humphrey's Executor justified the fears of those who foresaw a dramatic expansion of the administrative state. The decision set forth an approach to separationof-powers analysis that arguably made the "headless fourth branch"
constitutionally possible. Ironically, no less an opponent of the New
Deal than Justice Sutherland wrote the opinion for the Court. For
Justice Sutherland, this case did not deal with purely executive officers-Federal Trade Commissioners occupy "no place in the executive department" and they exercise "no part of the executive
power vested by the Constitution in the President." 23 Though recognizing the Federal Trade Commissioners could investigate and
report antitrust violations, the Court rather conveniently concluded
that, to the extent that an officer "exercises any executive functionas distinguished from executive power in the constitutional sense[the officer] does so in the discharge and effectuation of... quasilegislative or quasi-judicial powers, or as [an officer of] an agency of
24
the legislative or judicial departments of the government."
Such an approach to separation of powers, though a seeming
21
22
23
24

Id. at 135.
R. JACKSON, supra note 4, at 109.

295 U.S. at 628.
Id.
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rebuke to President Roosevelt at the time the case was decided, in
fact helped establish the constitutional foundation for the pragmatic
approach to separation-of-powers analysis that so typified the New
Deal. Writing in 1938, James Landis, one of the New Deal's foremost architects, set forth his views on separation-of-powers questions by emphasizing what he called "intelligent realism." In
comparing corporate organization with the way he believed governments must be structured if they are to carry out their functions effectively, Landis wrote:
If in private life we were to organize a unit for the operation
of an industry, it would scarcely follow Montesquieu's lines. As
yet no organization in private industry either has been conceived
along those triadic contours, nor would its normal development,
if so conceived, have tended to conform to them. Yet the
problems of operating a private industry resemble to a great degree those entailed by its regulation....
The significance of this comparison is not that it may point to
a need for an expanding concept of the province of governmental
regulation, but rather that it points to the form which governmental action tends to take. As the governance of industry, bent upon
the shaping of adequate policies and the development of means
for their execution, vests powers to this end without regard to the
creation of agencies theoretically independent of each other, so
when government concerns itself with the stability of an industry
it is only intelligent realism for it to follow the industrial rather
than the political analogue. It vests the necessary powers with the
administrative authority it creates, not too greatly concerned with
the extent to which such action does violence to the traditional
tripartite theory of governmental organization.2 5
Humphrey's Executor provided the constitutional flexibility necessary
for such an approach to governance to work.
In retrospect, Black Monday was not nearly as bad as it seemed
at the time. The takings clause approach of LouisvilleJoint Stock Land
Bank v. Radford never developed into a serious constitutional impediment to governmental regulation in general or the New Deal in particular.2 6 The nondelegation doctrine, as it turns out, peaked on
May 27, 1935. Though Panama and Schechter technically continue to
be good law, the Court has never again struck down an act of Congress as violative of the nondelegation doctrine. And Humphrey's Ex-

25

J. LANDIS, THE ADMINISTRATIVE PROCESS

10-12 (1938).

26 See, e.g., Agins v. City of Tiburon, 447 U.S. 255 (1980) (land use regulations
upheld as reasonable); Goldblatt v. Town of Hempstead, 369 U.S. 590 (1962) (restrictions on landowner's ability to excavate upheld). But see R. EPSTEIN, TAKINGS: PRIVATE
PROPERTY AND THE POWER OF EMINENT DOMAIN (1985).
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ecutor, as we have seen, turned out to be genuinely helpful by
bestowing constitutional legitimacy on independent commissions.
II
BLACK MONDAY RETURNS?

The issues raised in the cases decided on Black Monday were
not decided in so authoritative and clear a manner as to justify or
explain why they became, essentially, non-issues. Yet, for nearly 50
years, these questions have sparked little more than sporadic academic interest and have had little practical effect at the federal level.
Humphrey's Executor seemed immune from serious judicial reexamination. Occasionally, a court might evoke the ghosts of Panama or
Schechter,2 7 usually in dissent, and every now and then, a significant
takings clause challenge would reappear. 28 Justice (now Chief Justice) Rehnquist's concurrence in Industrial Union Department,AFL-CIO
v. American Petroleum Institute2 9 and his dissent in American Textile Manufacturers Institute v. Donovan,3 0 however, have rekindled a serious interest in the delegation doctrine. Indeed, an important distinction
between Justice Rehnquist's opinions and the sporadic evocation of
the ghosts of Panama and Schechter in the past is the way in which
these opinions now resonate with recent Supreme Court majority
opinions.
In Immigration & Naturalization Services v. Chadha,3 1 the Court
struck down the legislative veto as unconstitutional and violative of
fundamental separation-of-powers principles. In so doing, Chief
Justice Burger's majority opinion took a very formalistic, distinctly
non-New Deal approach to the separation-of-powers questions this
case presented. Its emphasis on the distinct and separate powers of
the legislative, executive, and judicial branches of government
nicely complements the formalistic constitutional approach to the
delegation doctrine taken by Justice Rehnquist.
Similarly, another relatively recent Supreme Court majority
opinion lends credence to the separation-of-powers fundamentalism
27 See, e.g., Arizona v. California, 373 U.S. 546, 626 (1963) (HarlanJ, dissenting in
part).
28 See, e.g., United States v. Causby, 328 U.S. 256 (1946) (U.S. warplanes, in following Civil Aeronautics Authority-approved flightpath, flew only 83 feet above Causby's
farm; constituted taking notwithstanding congressional determination that navigable
airspace is in public domain).
29 448 U.S. 607, 671-88 (1980). In addition to Justice Rehnquist's concurrence, it

is important to note thatJustice Stevens, writing for the plurality, also cited Panama and
Schechter and concluded that the statute in the present case should be construed to avoid
giving the agency so much discretion as to raise the constitutional issue of delegation.

Id. at 646.
30
31

452 U.S. 490, 543-48 (1981).
462 U.S. 919 (1983).
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that seems to typify recent Supreme Court approaches. In Northern
Pipeline Construction Co. v. Marathon Pipe Line Co.,3 2 the Court struck
down Congress's attempt to establish article I courts to deal with
bankruptcy claims. The Court found an unconstitutional delegation
of article III adjudicatory power and in the process resurrected yet
33
another administrative law ghost, Crowell v. Benson.
Finally, and perhaps even more significantly, the separation-ofpowers fundamentalism underlying Chadha was given further and
even deeper expression in Bowsher v. Synar.3 4 In so doing, the Court
opened to question Humphrey's Executor and, more fundamentally,
the constitutional basis for regulatory commissions, particularly independent commissions. Indeed, pending cases seek to extend the
reasoning in Bowsher by asking the Court to declare, for example,
the Federal Trade Commission Act of 1913 unconstitutional.3 5 The
fundamentalist position challenges not only independent agencies,
but also underlies attacks on other, delicate political balancing acts,
such as the ability of courts to select a special prosecutor under the
Ethics in Government Act of 1978.36
There can be little doubt that these issues are of fundamental
importance, and that the courts in years past have never really dealt
with them in an analytically compelling and convincing manner.
That these questions are again up for grabs has not been lost on the
present Attorney General. In distinct contrast to James Landis, who
was struggling with the question of how best to regulate businesses
at the federal level, Attorney General Edwin Meese III sees a very
different problem:
By federalizing so many issues we have shifted the forum of
dispute resolution away from our communities, away from our local governments and courts, to Washington. By creating an immense federal beauracracy [sic] to regulate, promulgate-and, too
often, obfuscate-with regard to federal legal matters, we have
lost an ability to affix responsibility; and that is an ability central to
32 458 U.S. 50 (1982). But see Thomas v. Union Carbide Agric. Prods. Co., 473 U.S.
568 (1985) (Justice O'Connor's majority opinion undercuts "public"/"private" rights
distinction resurrected by plurality opinion in Northern Pipeline); see also Commodity Futures Trading Comm'n v. Schor, 106 S. Ct. 3245 (1986).
33 285 U.S. 22, 56 (1932) (Congress may not "substitute for constitutional courts,
in which the judicial power of the United States is vested, an administrative agency...
for the final determination of the existence of the facts upon which the enforcement of
the constitutional rights of the citizen depend.").
34
106 S.Ct. 3181 (1986).
35
See, e.g., Federal Trade Comm'n v. American Nat'l Cellular, Inc., 810 F.2d 1511
(9th Cir. 1987) (upholding FTC enforcement power by relying on Humphrey's Executor
and Bowsher).
36
28 U.S.C. §§ 591-598 (1982 & Supp. III 1985); see North v. Walsh, 656 F. Supp.
414 (D.D.C. 1987); Deaver v. Seymour, 656 F. Supp. 900 (D.D.C. 1987), af'd, No. 875056 (D.C. Cir. Mar. 17, 1987).
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For the solution, Attorney General Meese turns to the Founding
Fathers:
The men who wrote the Constitution were keenly concerned
with accountability. They were too familiar with the dangers of
despotic authority and the weaknesses of an unwritten constitution to leave the spelling out of authority and the accumulation of
power to chance. The Founding Fathers could not anticipate all
the problems with which government would eventually grapple,
but they could do at least two things: they could count and they
could divide. They created a federal government of three well-defined branches. And they carefully enumerated the powers and
responsibilities of each. With a few exceptions, such as the veto
and impeachment powers, they vested the legislative power solely
in the Congress, the executive power solely in the President, and
the judicial power solely in the courts. 38
Such an approach has very definite implications for both the
structure and status of administrative agencies today. As the following articles in this symposium make clear, however, the issues involved are far more complex. For Professor Sargentich, the issues
reflect to a large extent basic normative tensions and conflicts within
our political system, conflicts that do not lend themselves to any
simple resolution, especially one based on an appeal to some preexisting constitutional formula. Professor Sargentich's analysis
highlights how various normative views, in fact, inform and color
various separation-of-powers theories. Professor Strauss pursues
the traditional formalistic and functionalist approaches inherent in
the case law, and seeks to reconcile the Court's recent cases on a
doctrinal level. In so doing, he strives to elucidate a "contemporary
shape" to separation-of-powers principles. Professor Levinson focuses on the Gramm-Rudman-Hollings legislation and the Bowsher
decision, placing the issues that this litigation raises in their current
context. He laments the fact that the Court may have missed a
golden opportunity to provide the President and Congress with guidance concerning the important budgetary questions inherent in the
Bowsher litigation. Finally, Professor Osgood steps back and takes a
37
Address by Attorney General Edwin Meese III, The Federal Bar Association 2-3
(Sept. 13, 1985) (on file at Cornell Law Review).
38
Id. at 3. He elaborates his position further:
In other words, federal agencies performing executive functions are
themselves properly agents of the executive. They are not "quasi" this,
or "independent" that. In the tripartite scheme of government a body
with enforcement powers is part of the executive branch of government.
Power granted by Congress should be properly understood as power

granted to the Executive.
Id. at 10.
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historical perspective on constitutional issues and approaches, in
general, and separation-of-powers questions in particular. He suggests that the constitutional issues generated by these issues are
closely related to the underlying social order of the times in which
they arise.
This symposium is timely indeed. The ghosts of Panama,
Schechter, and Crowell are loose once again and the continued existence of Humphrey's Executor may be in doubt. The issues before us
reverberate beyond the concerns ofjust a few judges or academics.
Resolving these issues may have a profound effect on how our government structure responds to the future. As we grapple with these
perennial separation-of-powers themes and attempt to resolve them
once again, one cannot help but wonder whether we will be any
more successful now than in the past.

